Overreaction and underreaction on the BUCHAREST STOCK EXCHANGE by Stefanescu, Razvan et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Overreaction and underreaction on the
BUCHAREST STOCK EXCHANGE
Razvan Stefanescu and Ramona Dumitriu and Costel Nistor
Dunarea de Jos University of Galati, Dunarea de Jos University of
Galati, Romania, Dunarea de Jos University of Galati, Romania
12. April 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41555/
MPRA Paper No. 41555, posted 27. September 2012 10:28 UTC
   OVERREACTION AND UNDERREACTION ON THE  
BUCHAREST STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
 
Lect, Razvan Stefanescu, Lect, Ramona Dumitriu, and Assoc Prof, Costel Nistor 
 
University “Dunarea de Jos” Galati, Romania, rzvn_stefanescu@yahoo.com 
 
 
Abstract: Efficient Market Hypothesis states that financial markets react instantaneous and 
unbiased to new information. However, in the last decades empirical researches revealed some 
anomalies in investors reactions to the events that caused shocks on the financial markets. There are 
two main hypotheses to describe such behaviors. The first one - Overreaction Hypothesis stipulates 
that investors overreact on the day when a shock occurs and they correct on the next days by opposite 
actions. The second one - Underreaction Hypothesis considers that investors underreact on the day of 
a shock and they apply corrections on the next days by opposite actions. These behaviors are 
influenced by the nature of events that cause shocks and by some characteristics of the financial 
markets. In this paper we explore the short-term reactions that followed positive and negative shocks 
from the Romanian capital market, using daily values of the main indexes from the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange for a period of time between January 2005 and March 2011. Depending on the horizons 
taken into consideration and on the nature of the shocks we find evidences for  the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, Overreaction Hypothesis and the Underreaction Hypothesis. We also find that actual 
global crisis caused significant changes in the investors’ reactions to the shocks.   
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1. Introduction 
One of the most disputed principles of 
Fama (1970) Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) states that prices of the financial 
assets react instantaneous and unbiased to 
new information [9]. In the last decades the 
financial literature provided pro and contra 
arguments to this statement [4, 10, 11, 12, 
15]. 
Researches revealed various 
anomalies that induce doubt to EMH. Some 
of them are associated to the financial 
markets reactions to the shocks. In the field 
of the behavioral finance there are two main 
hypotheses that contest the efficient 
reactions to the shocks: Overreaction 
Hypothesis (OH) and Underreaction 
Hypothesis (UH). OH presumes that 
investors overreact to the positive shocks 
(usually generated by unexpected and 
extreme good news) and to the negative 
shocks (which usualy followed unexpected 
and extreme bad news) correcting their 
behavior lately [7, 8, 16]. The knowledge 
about these reactions could be fructified by 
employing contrarian strategies in which 
past loser stocks are bought and past winner 
stocks are sold [1, 13 ].  
UH presumes that investors 
underreact to the shocks and adjust their 
behavior in the next days [5, 6]. The 
knowledge about underreactions could be 
exploited by momentum strategies which 
consist in buying the past winner stocks and 
selling the past loser stocks [2, 18]. 
Some empirical researches found 
that size of a firm could significantly 
influence the reactions to shocks of its stock 
prices [3, 17, 19]. It was also revealed that 
in turbulent times these reactions were 
different to the ones from quiet times [14]. 
In this paper we investigate the 
reactions to shocks on the Romanian capital 
market. In our investigation we use daily 
values of eight important indexes from the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) for two 
periods of time: before and during the 
global crisis.    
The remainder of the paper is 
organized as it follows: the second part 
describes the data and methodology 
employed in our investigation, the third part 
presents the empirical results and the fourth 
part concludes.  
2. Data and Methodology 
In our investigation we employ daily 
closing values of the main indexes from the 
two components of BSE: BET, where are 
listed all big companies, and RASDAQ, 
where are listed smaller firms. For BET we 
use five indexes: 
- BET, that expresses the price movement 
of the most liquid 10 companies listed on 
the BVB regulated market; 
- BET-C, which reflects the evolution of all 
the big companies listed on BSE, excepting 
the investment funds (SIFs); 
- BET-FI, that describes the price 
movement of the investment funds (SIFs); 
- BET-XT, which reflects the evolution of 
the most liquid 25 shares traded on the 
BSE, including SIFs; 
- BET-NG, that expresses the evolution of 
companies which have the main business 
activity located in the energy sector and the 
related utilities. 
For RASDAQ we employ the values of 
three indexes:  
- RASDAQ-C (RAQ-C), which 
describes the prices evolution of all the 
stocks, traded on RASDAQ market; 
- RAQ-I, that expresses the prices of 
the stocks listed on the First Category of 
Excellence on RASDAQ market; 
- RAQ-II, which reflects the prices of 
the stocks listed on the Second Category of 
Excellence on RASDAQ market. 
           For each index we use a sample of 
data for the period January 2005 – March 
2011, except for BET-XT and BET-NG 
which were introduced on January 2007. 
We split each sample into two sub-samples: 
before and after 15th of September 2008 
(the day when it was announced the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers).  
For each index i we calculate the 
raw return (ri,t) by the formula:  
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where Pi,t and Pi,t-1 are the closing 
prices of index i on the days t and t-1, 
respectively. 
We identify the positive and 
negative shocks using the method employed 
by Lasfer et al. (2003) [14]. We find that a 
positive shock occurs in a day t+ if the 
following condition is satisfied: 
)(*2)( ]11;60,[]11;60,[, −−−− +>+ iiti rSTDrAVGr (2)                         
where +tir ,  is the return of the index 
i from the day t+, AVG (ri,[-60;-11]) is the 
average daily returns for a period that starts  
60 days before the day t+, and ends 11 days 
before the day t+, while STD (ri,[-60;-11]) is 
the standard deviation for the same period.  
We find that a negative shock 
occurs in a day t- if the following condition 
is satisfied: 
)(*2)( ]11;60,[]11;60,[, −−−− −<− iiti rSTDrAVGr (3)                         
where  
−tir ,  is the return of the index 
i from the day t-. 
We separate the autonomous shocks 
from the positive or negative shocks we 
detected by excluding the successive shocks 
(a successive shock is one that occurs less 
than 10 days after an autonomous shock). In 
order to identify over, under and efficient 
reactions we compute the post-shocks 
abnormal returns (ARi,t) using the formula: 
        ARi,t = ri,t - AVG(ri,[-60;-11])           (4)                         
For each autonomous shock we 
calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
for the next 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10 days as: 
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where ntiCAR ,  is the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns of the index i for the 
next n days that follow an autonomous 
shock from a day t. 
We compute the Average 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the index 
i for the next n days ( ntiACAR , ) as: 
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We employ for each autonomous 
shock, t-statistics, to test the significance of 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns. 
Based on the tests results we classify the 
after shock behaviours of returns into three 
categories: 
- Overreactions, when a positive shock is 
followed by significant negative abnormal 
returns or when a negative shock is 
followed by significant positive abnormal 
returns; 
- Underreactions, when a positive shock is 
followed by significant positive abnormal 
returns or when a negative shock is 
followed by significant negative abnormal 
returns; 
- Efficient reactions, when we don’t find 
significant positive or negative abnormal 
returns after an autonomous shock.                     
3. Empirical Results 
           Table 1 and 2 present the shocks that 
occurred on BSE before and during the 
global crisis. We find that largest amounts 
of positive and negative shocks were for 
RAQ II which includes the smallest 
companies.
Table 1 Shocks before the global crisis  
Positive shocks Negative shocks 
Index Number of 
shocks 
Mean reaction Number of 
shocks 
Mean reaction 
BET 17 3.59837 16 -3.8248 
BET C 17 3.05788 18 -3.24778 
BET FI 20 5.21389 17 -4.843 
BET NG 8 3.90775 9 -3.67398 
BET XT 10 3.70531 9 -4.66584 
RAQ C 15 4.23921 17 -3.49404 
RAQ I 27 4.93983 15 -4.30664 
RAQ II 27 4.71395 20 -4.32176 
 
Table 2 Shocks during the global crisis  
Positive shocks Negative shocks Index 
Number of 
shocks 
Mean reaction Number of 
shocks 
Mean reaction 
BET 16 5.47769 19 -5.37829 
BET C 18 4.74996 19 -4.68247 
BET FI 19 7.05576 15 -6.05096 
BET NG 19 5.27121 19 -4.19939 
BET XT 17 5.24995 17 -5.03733 
RAQ C 16 2.17871 17 -1.91937 
RAQ I 20 6.4429 23 -9.22096 
RAQ II 23 9.72803 27 -8.31141 
 
Table 3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a positive shock before the global crisis 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
BET 0.943173 
(1.71015) 
1.66516 
(2.56472**) 
1.68875 
(2.35056**) 
1.43701 
(1.66098) 
0.891975 
(0.843542) 
1.96108 
(1.29063) 
BET C 1.0056 
(1.85846*) 
1.53713 
(2.55656**) 
1.47279 
(2.42051**) 
1.43778 
(1.92535*) 
1.23546 
(1.37775) 
1.69012 
(1.27861) 
BET FI 1.32763 
(1.54032) 
1.55324 
(1.79411*) 
1.28153 
(1.30952) 
0.876127 
(0.832044) 
1.15156 
(0.847187) 
1.04119 
(0.575465) 
BET 
NG 
0.166919 
(0.168308) 
1.28516 
(1.05882) 
1.90017 
(1.05582) 
2.41443 
(1.04599) 
2.31099 
(0.928202) 
1.24617 
(0.452795) 
BET 0.644605 0.578168 0.549095 0.777279 0.448091 7.41081 
XT (0.85773) (0.978159) (0.576237) (0.988733) (0.505249) (0.043444) 
RAQ C 0.285537 
(1.05883) 
0.351169 
(1.00302) 
0.354135 
(0.778395) 
0.636862 
(1.04171) 
0.269359 
(0.318474) 
0.492269 
(0.385326) 
RAQ I 0.635753 
(1.232) 
0.205496 
(0.318628) 
0.490757 
(0.692632) 
0.684369 
(0.943039) 
0.993646 
(1.11038) 
1.0121 
(0.83404) 
RAQ II -0.367333 
(-0.923) 
-1.10102 
(-1.9424**) 
-0.844754 
(-1.30142) 
-0.732716 
(-0.83535) 
-0.754812 
(-0.899155) 
-0.376666 
(-0.321115) 
Notes: t-statistic appears in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
Table 4 Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a negative shock before the global crisis 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
BET -0.0295 
(-0.061) 
0.0658311 
(0.09064) 
-0.43312 
(-0.40114) 
-0.458276 
(-0.42108) 
-0.903597 
(-0.75166) 
-0.537274 
(-0.27954) 
BET C 0.0938725 
(0.215037) 
0.383922 
(0.602729) 
0.17794 
(0.204055) 
0.0582945 
(0.0573443) 
0.149635 
(0.148343) 
-0.383489 
(-0.23733) 
BET FI 0.358872 
(0.413101) 
0.936365 
(1.169) 
0.409102 
(0.339922) 
0.0746547 
(0.0621584) 
-0.798043 
(-0.5260) 
-0.610803 
(-0.32523) 
BET 
NG 
0.501898 
(0.561493) 
0.430441 
(0.34553) 
0.573139 
(0.469545) 
-0.747417 
(-0.586149) 
-0.030971 
(-0.01934) 
2.66218 
(0.906025) 
BET 
XT 
-0.967921 
(-1.16303) 
-1.05021 
(-0.878321) 
-1.14683 
(-0.80499) 
-0.252871 
(-0.163324) 
-1.02144 
(-0.49449) 
-1.09147 
(-0.37542) 
RAQ C -0.201129 
(-1.06918) 
-0.0824298 
(-0.244502) 
-0.47763 
(-1.04904) 
-0.60284 
(-1.10197) 
-0.927201 
(-1.26342) 
-1.30055 
(-1.36118) 
RAQ I 0.165478 
(0.328312) 
-0.775217 
(-1.05162) 
-0.94203 
(-0.98517) 
-1.62801 
(-1.31632) 
-2.37769 
(-1.74765) 
-1.71297 
(-0.87042) 
RAQ II 0.729 
(1.06811) 
0.942025 
(1.10849) 
0.82596 
(0.936872) 
1.54546 
(1.28096) 
1.69353 
(1.19979) 
2.12698 
(1.21384) 
Note: t-statistic appears in parentheses. 
 
          In the Table 3 there are presented the cumulative abnormal returns that followed 
positive shocks before the global crisis. Depending on the horizon of time, the results provide 
arguments in favour of all the three hypotheses. For three indexes we found evidences that 
support UH: BET, for the second and third day, BET-C for the first fourth days and BET FI 
for the second day. We detect evidences in favour of OH for the second day of RAQ II. EMH 
cannot be rejected in the case of four indexes: BET NG, BET XT, RAQ C and RAQ I.   
            The Table 4 presents the values of  cumulative abnormal returns that followed the 
negative shocks before the global crisis. The results provide, for all the eight indexes, 
evidences in favour of EMH.  
Table 5 Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a positive shock during the global crisis 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
BET 0.837295 
(0.882114) 
1.06806 
(1.08252) 
2.00702 
(2.30797**) 
2.3822 
(2.10447*) 
2.6627 
(1.51444) 
1.1262 
(0.35643) 
BET C 0.8215 
(0.961155) 
0.564314 
(0.622928) 
0.854924 
(0.95382) 
0.564863 
(0.439933) 
0.162953 
(0.0796474) 
-0.330482 
(-0.10433) 
BET FI 1.30949 
(1.39117) 
1.28286 
(1.91609*) 
2.15118 
(0.1441) 
2.73349 
(1.28209) 
2.44585 
(1.12012) 
0.652738 
(0.157679) 
BET NG 0.744271 
(0.753817) 
1.17066 
(1.22283) 
1.11067 
(1.16603) 
1.28189 
(1.01187) 
1.01813 
(0.515857) 
0.134758 
(0.04315) 
BET XT 0.745012 
(0.872271) 
1.21718 
(1.88119*) 
1.51398 
(2.0874*) 
2.20664 
(1.82311*) 
1.9061 
(1.21401) 
1.61665 
(0.507954) 
RAQ C -0.328316 
(-1.21931) 
-0.71745 
(-2.053*) 
-0.827581 
(-2.00641*) 
-0.860031 
(-1.71945) 
-0.378521 
(-0.616054) 
0.0222189 
(0.026588) 
RAQ I -0.112357 
(-0.21003) 
-0.667927 
(-0.81517) 
-1.00124 
(-1.23041) 
-0.934269 
(-0.95495) 
-1.7033 
(-1.16154) 
-5.49357 
(-2.5054**) 
RAQ II -1.50087 
(-2.358**) 
-1.66889 
(-1.8156*) 
-2.03751 
(-1.73106*) 
-2.41878 
(-2.186**) 
-2.5439 
(-2.04988*) 
-4.19852 
(-3.022***) 
Notes: t-statistic appears in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
Table 6 Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a negative shock during the global crisis 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
BET 0.949883 
(0.93285) 
0.907245 
(0.667444) 
3.05091 
(2.7961**) 
3.74236 
(3.13089***) 
3.01029 
(3.35211***) 
1.38333 
(0.7853) 
BET C -1.06851 
(-1.2235) 
-0.878594 
(-0.75332) 
0.287262 
(0.217518) 
0.493551 
(0.304598) 
0.44142 
(0.38798) 
0.304916 
(0.184709) 
BET FI -1.1921 
(-1.0139) 
-4.64714 
(-1.864*) 
-6.51558 
(-2.4417**) 
-6.04578 
(-1.93285*) 
-4.92266 
(2.05731*) 
-2.95299 
(-0.98518) 
BET 
NG 
0.298486 
(0.283533) 
-0.689456 
(-0.38215) 
-0.481995 
(-0.251708) 
-0.269625 
(-0.117169) 
0.0202664 
(0.0120112) 
0.0794708 
(0.0424339) 
BET 
XT 
-1.39257 
(-1.29374) 
-1.20192 
(-0.80738) 
-0.524099 
-0.324704 
-0.362944 
(-0.175975) 
-0.187294 
(-0.125677) 
0.518979 
(0.227606) 
RAQ C -1.37899 
(-1.30749) 
-1.84362 
(-1.6554) 
-1.48335 
(-1.3023) 
-1.48396 
(-1.22557) 
-1.39293 
(-1.10673) 
-1.65857 
(-1.24514) 
RAQ I 0.621221 
(1.43048) 
0.699991 
(1.02639) 
0.197803 
(0.185911) 
0.522081 
(0.502493) 
-0.465189 
(-0.388121) 
-1.26799 
(-0.805) 
RAQ II 0.805551 
(0.946567) 
1.46332 
(1.22858) 
1.56499 
(1.33808) 
1.62899 
(1.14978) 
1.40282 
(1.04184) 
2.57931 
(1.67919) 
Notes: t-statistic appears in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
 
In the Table 5 there are presented the 
cumulative abnormal returns that followed 
the positive shocks before the global crisis.  
The results provide evidences in favour of 
UH in the case of three indexes: BET, for 
third and fourth days, BET FI, for the 
second day, and BET XT, between the 
second and fourth days. All the RASDAQ 
indexes offered symptoms of OH: RAQ C 
for the second and third days, RAQ I for the 
tenth day and RAQ II for the first fifth days 
and for the tenth day. For two indexes: Bet 
C and BET NG, the results indicate that 
EMH can not be rejected. 
The Table 6 presents the cumulative 
abnormal returns that followed the negative 
shocks before the global crisis. The results 
provide evidences in favour of OH for two 
indexes: BET, between the third and fifth 
days and BET FI between the second and 
the fifth days. For the rest of six indexes, 
the results are in favour of EMH. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigated the 
reactions to shocks of eight indexes from 
BSE. The results revealed some 
circumstances with significant influence on 
the reactions to shocks.  
In the case of BET NG and BET XT 
we find no evidence in favour of UH or OH 
before the global crisis. This situation could 
be explained, in part, by the fact that two 
indexes were introduced in 2007 so the 
period of analysis was shorter in 
comparison with the other indexes. 
However, we also cannot reject EMH for 
BET NG reactions during the global crisis.  
This situation could be linked to the fact 
that circumstances which caused shocks in 
the Romanian energy sector during the both 
periods were very heterogeneous.  
For the positive shocks from the two 
periods of time we found underreactions 
only for BET market, while the 
overreactions occurred only for RASDAQ 
market. These results could be explained by 
the size effect: in the case of small firms 
stocks from RASDAQ investors’ 
expectations were more optimistic in 
comparison with the big companies stocks 
from BET. For the RASDAQ indexes the 
overreactions were more consistent during 
the global crisis than before it.  
We identified only efficient reactions 
to the negative shocks before the global 
crisis. In this period BSE experienced an 
ascendant trend and the negative shocks 
were caused by heterogeneous events. 
During the global crisis we found 
overreactions on BET market. This 
evolution could be explained by the 
pessimistic expectations about the big 
companies stocks. 
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